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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT
OF REAL PROPERTY: A VIOLATION OF FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS-MPI, Inc. v. McCullough,
463 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
On November 17, 1978, the defendant Dupre', through the
Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Chickasaw County,
Mississippi, caused a chancery writ of attachment to be issued on
certain property on which MPI's manufacturing plant was located in
Houston, Mississippi. The writ was obtained to secure payment of
monies allegedly due Dupre' by MPI as a result of a prior employment
contract between the parties.
A month later MPI applied to the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Mississippi, Eastern Division, for a
preliminary injunction to restrain state officials from issuing the
chancery attachment, to restrain Dupre' from applying for a writ of
attachment under the state chancery procedure, and to enjoin Dupr6
from prosecuting his action for damages in the chancery court. MPI
also sought a declaratory judgment that the Mississippi chancery
attachment procedure was unconstitutional. MPI based its cause of
action on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'
The district court quashed the chancery attachment issued against
MPI and held, that "the chancery statute procedure as to the realty of
a nonresident debtor (no less than the seizure of personalty) is
violative of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment both
facially (as the Mississippi statutes are presently written) and as
applied to the facts of this particular case." 2
In reaching its conclusion the district court addressed three issues;
whether it should abstain from hearing the case out of considerations
of comity and federalism; the constitutionality of the chancery
attachment procedure as to real property; and whether injunctive
relief was an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. The scope
of this note will be limited to the issue of the constitutionality of the
Mississippi chancery attachment procedure as applied to real
property.
'Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
"MPI, Inc. v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Miss. 1978). Both MPI and
Dupre' are non-residents of Mississippi. MPI Inc. is a corporation created under Texas
law. Even though MPI is registered to do business in Mississippi and has a registered
agent for service of process, it is nonetheless deemed a non-resident for purposes of
chancery attachment.
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DUE PROCESS AND THE SEIZURE OF PROPERTY
Under the fourteenth amendment states are forbidden from
depriving any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.' The term "due process" is admittedly obscure and thus defies
definition in a broad sense. It has been said that by its very nature due
process disallows inflexible procedures which are universally
applicable to any imaginable situation and that it is not a technical
conception unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Because of
the vagueness of the term it is sometimes difficult to specify precisely
what procedure is required in order to comport with the requirements
of due process.
One of the purposes of due process is to safeguard against
arbitrary or unjustified deprivations of property.5 Consequently, due
process has been said to be satisfied when the deprivation has been
preceded by notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case.'
Based, in part, on the forgoing propositions the Supreme Court
decided the cases of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.' and Goldberg
v. Kelly.' In Sniadach, the Court held unconstitutional the Wisconsin
prejudgment garnishment procedure in which summons was issuable
at the request of the creditor's lawyer. By the issuance of the summons
the debtor's wages were frozen until the trial of the main case. The
Court held that such a temporary non-final deprivation of property is
nonetheless a deprivation worthy of due process protection. It was
further stated that absent prior notice and opportunity for a hearing,
such a procedure violated the principles of due process." In Goldberg,
the Court similarly determined that New York's procedure for
terminating welfare benefits violated procedural due process in that
no pretermination hearing was held prior to cessation of benefits.' 0
As a result of Sniadach and Goldberg it appeared that the rule
relating to deprivation of property was that property could not be
taken without the procedural safeguards of preseizure notice and
hearing. Several lower courts felt that such a rule was too restrictive
and consequently read Sniadach and Goldberg narrowly holding that
due process required preseizure notice and hearing only when the
'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
*Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
'See, e.g., Coss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 392 F. Supp. 1385 (W.D. Penn. 1975). See also
Washington ex tel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberage, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
See Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
550 (1965); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-16 (1950).
'395 U.S. 337 (1969).
'397 U.S. 254 (1970).
'Sniadach v. Farpily Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. at 342.
"397 U.S. at 264.
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property deprived was considered a "necessity" such as wages or
welfare benefits."
In Fuentes v. Shevin 2 the Supreme Court dispelled the necessity
notion. The Court held unconstitutional the prejudgment replevin
statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania because they allowed the seller
of goods under a conditional sales contract to have the goods seized
without prior notice or hearing. 3
Focusing on the purpose of due process, the Court noted that -It]he
requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard raises no
impenetrable barrier to the taking of a person's possessions. But the
fair process of decision-making that it guarantees works, by itself, to
protect against arbitrary deprivation of property.""
While holding that property cannot be taken without a prior
opportunity to be heard, the Court pointed out that there are
circumstances under which notice and opportunity for hearing can be
delayed.
There are 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice
and opportunity for a hearing .... These situtations, however, must be
truly unusual. Only in a few limited situations has this court allowed
outright seizure without opportunity for a prior hearing. First, in each
case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a
special need for very prompt action. Third, the state has kept strict
control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the
seizure has been a government official responsible for determining,
under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute that it was necessary
and justified in the particular instance."
For nearly two years the Fuentes decision stood unshaken, until
the Court handed down Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.16 Mitchell
involved an attack on Louisiana's sequestration statute on the
grounds that it allowed seizure of goods without prior notice and
opportunity for hearing. The goods in question were purchased under
an installment sales contract and the seller had a vendor's lien on
them.
In upholding the constitutionality of the Louisiana procedure the
Court placed much emphasis on the fact that the creditor, by way of
his vendor's lien, also had an interest in the property siezed.
"See Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Conn. 1971);
Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (D. D.C. 1970); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior
Court of Maricopa County, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969).
21407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Id. at 96.
'Id. at 81.
"Id. at 90-91.
-6416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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Plainly enough, this is not a case where the property sequestered by
the court is exclusively the property of the defendant debtor. The
question is not whether a debtor's property may be seized by his
creditors, pendente lite, where they hold no present interest in property
sought to be seized. The reality is that both seller and buyer had
current, real interests in the property, and the definition of property
rights is a matter of state law. Resolution of the due process question
must take account not only of the interests of the buyer of the property
but those of the seller as well.'
In addition to recognizing the creditor's rights in the property, the
Court also noted the other procedural safeguards which were written
into the Louisiana procedure. Under the statutes the writ would not
issue on mere conclusory allegations of ownership or possessory
right.'" The writ could only be issued by a judge, and only after the
creditor seeking the writ had filed a sufficient bond to protect the
debtor against any damages should the action be resolved in the
debtor's favor. Furthermore, the statute entitled the debtor to seek
immediate dissolution of the writ, which must be ordered unless the
creditor proves the grounds upon which the writ was issued, that is
the existence of the debt, the lien, and the delinquency. 9
Based on these safeguards the Court distinguished Fuentes. "[W]e
are convinced that Fuentes was decided against a factual and legal
background sufficiently different from that now before us and that it
does not require the invalidation of the Louisiana sequestration
statute, either on its face or as applied in this case."-2 0 The Court
reasoned that the Louisiana procedure effected "a constitutional
accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties."2 '
In summarizing, the Court stated:
the Louisiana system seeks to minimize the risk of error of a wrongful
interim possession by the creditor. The system protects the debtor's
interest in every conceivable way, except allowing him to have the
property to start with, and this is done in pursuit of what we deem an
acceptable arrangement pendente lite to put the property in the
possession of the party who furnishes protection against loss or damage
to the other pending trial on the merits.
22
"Id. at 604.
'd. at 605. "Article 3501 provides that the writ of sequestration shall issue "only
when the nature of the claim and the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied
upon for the issuance of the writ clearly appear from specific facts' shown by a verified
petition or affidavit." Id.
"Id. at 606. Upon failure to prove the grounds the court may order the property
returned to the debtor and assess damages against the creditor including attorney's
fees. Id.
"Id. at 615.
"Id. at 607.
"Id. at 618.
(Vol. 1:329
PREJUDGMENT A TTACHMENT
Since Mitchell the only case decided by the Supreme Court
pertaining to the requirements of procedural due process when a
deprivation of property takes place was North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc.23 In that case the Georgia garnishment statute was
held unconstitutional as a violation of procedural due process.2 4 A
corporation's bank account was garnished under a procedure which
permitted the writ to be issued by a court clerk without participation
by a judge. The writ would issue on an affidavit by the plaintiff or his
attorney containing only conclusory allegations. The procedure made
no provision for early hearing.
The Court stated that the Georgia procedure was vulnerable for
the same reasons that the procedure in Fuentes had been vulnerable, 5
a lack of notice and opportunity for hearing prior to the seizure.
Furthermore, it was noted that the Georgia procedure had none of the
procedural safeguards of the Louisiana statute. "The affidavit.. .need
only contain conclusory allegations. The writ is issuable.., by the
court clerk, without participation by a judge .... [and] there is no
provision for an early hearing at which the creditor would be
required to demonstrate at least probable cause for the
garnishment." '
SNIADACH AND ITS PROGENY - A GENERAL RULE
In analyzing the preceding cases it is somewhat difficult to
determine, as a general rule, precisely what is required to satisfy due
process in any particular situation. Sniadach, Goldberg and Fuentes
appear to stand for the proposition that any deprivation of a
significant property interest prior to notice and hearing is violative of
due process and consequently unconstitutional. 27 However, the effect
that Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing have on this rule is
questionable."8
There seems to be two possible means of interpreting Mitchell and
North Georgia Finishing in conjunction with Fuentes. Under the first,
which will be referred to as the strict interpretation, the general rule
in regard to meeting the requirements of due process advocated in
Fuentes is: deprivation of a significant property interest is
unconstitutional if not preceded by notice and hearing, unless it falls
into the category of "extraordinary situations."
23419 U.S. 601 (1975).
'Id. at 606-08.
"Id. at 606.
2'Id. at 607.
"The only exceptions being the "extraordinary situations" espoused in Fuentes. See
note 1S and accompanying textural material, supra.
"Ilt is important to note that Mitchell did not overrule Fuentes and that North
Georgia Finishing did not overrule Mitchell. Therefore, all of these decisions must be
read in conjunction with each other.
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Mitchell is compatible with this interpretation if it is read to
involve an extraordinary situation excepted by the Fuentes general
rule. The exceptional situation would involve the real interest of the
creditor in the seized property,29 the issuance of the writ by a judge,
under strict statutory guidelines, and the availability of an immediate
post-seizure hearing."0 North Georgia Finishing fits into this scheme
nicely because the Court in that decision relied primarily on Fuentes
and invalidated the Georgia statute for the same reasons it had
invalidated the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes in Fuentes.
Consequently, Fuentes and North Georgia Finishing are general rule
and Mitchell is the exception.
Under the second possible interpretation, which will be referred to
as the liberal interpretation, Mitchell may be viewed as cutting back
on the strictness of the Fuentes rule requiring notice and hearing prior
to deprivation of a significant property interest. The only way this
interpretation is conceivable is to overlook the fact that the court in
Mitchell placed a great deal of emphasis on the creditor's real interest
in the property. However, it may be argued that the liberal
interpretation is reinforced by North Georgia Finishing. In dicta the
Court in North Georgia Finishing implied that the Georgia procedure
may have been valid had the writ been issued by a judge, based on an
affidavit going beyond mere conclusory allegations, and had the
procedure provided for an immediate post-seizure hearing and for
dissolution of the writ absent proof by the creditor of the grounds
upon which it was issued." While the Court in North Georgia Finish-
ing did mention that the creditor had a real interest in the property it
did not place emphasis on the fact as it had done in Mitchell.
Under the liberal interpretation the general rule might be stated as
the rule espoused in Mitchell without the requirement that the
attaching party have a real interest in the property attached. In other
words, as long as a judge could be shown that there is probable cause
for the writ to issue and such a showing goes beyond conclusory
allegations and there is a provision for an immediate post-seizure
hearing where the creditor has the burden of sustaining the writ under
the penalty of monetary damages, due process would be met.
"Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 604. A real interest is something, such as a
vendor's lien or a mechanic's lien, which gives the creditor a right to possession of the
property attached upon default. There must be a direct connection between the prop-
erty attached and the underlying claim.
"It appears that one court has adopted some of the reasoning of this strict interpreta-
tion. In Johnson v. Am. Credit Co. of Ga., 581 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1978), after American
Credit financed Johnson's automobile a dispute arose and Johnson stopped payments.
American Credit attached the car. In a suit challenging the constitutionality of the pro-
cedure the Fifth Circuit held "that due process requires that a prejudgment seizure be
authorized by a judge who has discretion to deny issuance of the appropriate writ." The
court went on to hold that the procedure was "facially unconstitutional." Id. at 534.
"See N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 606-07.
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The acceptability of the liberal interpretation is buttressed by the
fact that it tends to prevent arbitrary and unjustified deprivations;
one of the primary purposes of due process. However, based on
language from Sniadach, Goldberg, Fuentes, and North Georgia
Finishing, coupled with the distinguishing factor present in Mitchell,
that the creditor have a real interest in the property, it would appear
that the case law more substantially favors the strict interpretation."
While the liberal interpretation could be a viable alternative for
meeting due process at some future date it presently does not have
ample support.
DOES AN ATTACHMENT OF REAL PROPERTY WARRANT
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION?
Having reviewed the requirements necessary to meet due process
standards it becomes necessary to ascertain when those standards
should apply. Not all forms of property are subject to the protections
afforded by the fourteenth amendment. "The requirements of pro-
cedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty
and property."''- In light of the contentions of the defendants in MPI,
Inc., the inquiry becomes whether an attachment of real property
constitutes a "taking" sufficient to warrant fourteenth amendment
protection. 34 Even though an attachment does not affect the owner's
possession of the property it creates a lien 3 which acts to severely
restrict his ability to convey clear title to the land.
3
Several courts have held that placing a lien on property is not a
"While the dicta in North Georgia Finishing implied that the liberal interpretation
would have been sufficient, the decision was expressly based on Fuentes which is the
basis for the strict interpretation.
"Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
'The defendants in MPI, Inc. urged that Sniadach, Fuentes, and North Georgia
Finishing involved the attachment of only personalty, which caused the debtor to be
deprived of the use and possession of the attached property during the period it was
frozen by the attachment proceeding. The defendants sought
to distinguish those cases by asserting that they involved a significant taking of
such a nature as to implicate the due process clause, while an attachment upon
realty is no deprivation of use or possession during the interval of the attach-
ment .... [Ain attachment of real estate which is left in the hands of the debtor
who has the right to use and enjoy it until the chancery court orders otherwise, is
not such a significant taking or burden as to be protected by the Due Process
Clause and that, therefore, the Mississippi chancery statute is constitutional as to
realty, even though it may be constitutionally infirm as to personalty.
MPI, Inc. v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. at 897.
"See generally Ryals v. Douglas, 205 Miss. 695, 39 So. 2d 311 (1949).
"See generally Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (S. D.
Me. 1973).
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"taking" which warrants fourteenth amendment protection." In most
of these cases, the courts seem to place considerable emphasis on the
fact that the land owner was never deprived of possession of the land.
Such treatment by the courts indicates that they were balancing the
gravity of the deprivation suffered by the property owner against the
creditor's right to secure an obligation due him. The use of a
balancing test has been recognized by several courts for determining
that process which is due in a particular situation. 8 However, a
balancing test has not been recognized for determining whether or not
due process applies.
[A] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the
form of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due pro-
cess. But, to determine whether due process requirements apply in the
first place, we must look not to the "weight" but to the nature of the in-
terest at stake .... We must look to see if the interest is within the Four-
teenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property. (footnote
omitted).3
The nature of the interest at stake is that of property rights. Prop-
erty rights have always warranted protection under the constitution."
Included in the bundle of property rights is, among other things, the
right to dispose of the property as one sees fit."' Consequently, if the
right to dispose of the property has been infringed there has been a
deprivation of that property. 2
Applying the forgoing propositions to attachment of real property,
it is obvious that such an attachment is a "taking" worthy of four-
teenth amendment protection. The attachment places a lien or cloud
"See, e.g., Hansen v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 526 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 907 (1976); In re the Oronoka, 393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975); Central
Security Nat'1 Bank v. Royal Homes, Inc., 371 Supp. 476 (E. D. Mich. 1974);
Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hansons, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), affd, 417 U.S.
901 (1974); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24 (S.D.S.D. 1973); Black Watch Farms, Inc.
v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971).
"*See generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
"Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71.
"0"It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected from
discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, en-
joy, own and dispose of property." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948); See also
United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946).
4 Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns and includes the right
to acquire, use and dispose of it. These essential attributes of property are protected by
the Constitution. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Kass v. Lewin, 104 So. 2d
572 (Fla. 1958).
"Mclnnes v. McKay, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd 279 U.S. 820 (1928). "[T~he power of
disposition at the will of the owner is property. Deprivation does not require actual
physical taking of the property or the thing itself. It takes place when the free use and
enjoyment of the thing or the power to dispose of it at will is affected." Id. at 702.
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upon the title of the property which unquestionably infringes the
property owner's right to dispose of the property.' 3
There is only one case which appears to be in discord with the
concept that a lien on real property constitutes a "taking" which re-
quires fourteenth amendment protection. That case is Spielman-Fond,
Inc. v. Hansons, Inc., which was summarily affirmed by the Supreme
Court." The Arizona mechanic's and materialmen's lien statute was
challenged for violating the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In upholding the statutory procedure the Arizona Dis-
trict Court said the filing of such a lien failed to amount to a taking of
a significant enough property interest to warrant the notice and hear-
ing requirements of due process.'5
Since Spielman-Fond was affirmed by the Supreme Court it is
possible to argue that the Court has upheld the idea that a lien on real
property does not constitute a "taking" sufficient to warrant due pro-
cess protections. The validity of such an argument is determined by
the significance of a summary affirmance. In Hicks v. Miranda" it
was stated that a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court is a deci-
sion on the merits.' 7 Based on this it might appear that the Court has
adopted the language and reasoning of the Arizona District Court and
agreed that the filing of a lien does not amount to a taking of a signifi-
cant property interest. However, in the more recent case of Mandel v.
Bradley," the Court said:
[blecause a summary affirmance is an affirmance of the judgment only,
the rationale of the affirmance may not be gleaned solely from the
opinion below.
'When we summarily affirm, without opinion .... we affirm the
judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached. An
unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and
is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously
announced in our opinions after full argument.' Fusari v. Steinberg,
(cite omitted) (concurring opinion of the chief justice).4 9
The Court in Mandel went on to state that "[slummary affir-
mances... do prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclu-
'"It is possible to argue that the placing of a lien on real property does not warrant
fourteenth amendment protection because it is not a total deprivation of the right to
dispose of the property but only a factor which makes alienation more difficult.
However, such an argument is tenuous because for all practical purposes a lien such as
attachment would restrict alienability to the point where it would act as a total depriva-
tion.
-379 F. Supp 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), affd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
'lid. at 999.
"s422 U.S. 332 (1975).
'
7d. at 344.
4"432 U.S. 173 (1977).
"4Id. at 2240.
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sions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those
actions.... Summary actions, however, .. . should not be understood
as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by
prior decisions to the particular facts involved."5 0
In light of the Court's language in Mandel, the decision of
Spielman-Fond should be limited to the precise facts and issues before
the Court in that case, that is, whether Arizona's mechanic and
materialmen's lien statute met due process requirements. By sum-
marily affirming the district court's decision, the Supreme Court held
merely that the procedure in question had adequate procedural safe-
guards and therefore did not violate the fourteenth amendment. The
Court in no way passed upon the question of whether the lien was a
"taking" of property sufficient to warrant fourteenth amendment
protection. Consequently, the Supreme Court has not ruled that the
placing of a lien on real property is unworthy of fourteenth amend-
ment protections. The lack of such a decision coupled with the fact
that the right to dispose of one's property is protected leads to the con-
clusion that any procedure pertaining to an attachment or the placing
of a lien on real estate must be accorded due process protections.
In summary, before any significant property interest can be taken
from someone under color of state law, procedural due process must
be met. Provisions must generally be made for notice and a hearing
prior to the seizure of the property. However, there are "extra-
ordinary situations" where postponement of notice and hearing is
justified.s1 In addition to these extraordinary situations, notice and
hearing may also be postponed in situations where the creditor has a
real interest in the property being seized, provided that other pro-
cedural safeguards are inherent in the statute that authorized the
seizure. Finally, when determining whether due process re-
quirements are applicable the nature of the deprivation should be the
focal point and not the gravity of the deprivation.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION IN MPI, INC.
In reaching its decision on the constitutionality of the Mississippi
chancery attachment laws the district court began by reviewing the
statutory procedure. Among the characteristics of the Mississippi pro-
cedure noted by the federal court were the following:
-Jurisdiction of attachments is lodged in chancery court.
5 3
.1ld.
"Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (to protect the public
from mishandled drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (to protect against the
economic disaster of a bank failure); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (to
collect the internal revenue of the United States); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94
(192 1) (the use of attachment to secure jurisdiction in state court); Central Union Trust
Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921) (to meet the needs of a national war effort).
"See notes 29, 44-46 and accompanying textual material, supra.
"Mtss. CODE ANN. § 11-31-1 (1972).
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-A foreign corporation, though qualified to do business in the
state is considered a nonresident."4
-It is immaterial to the validity of the attachment that personal
judgment can be obtained against a "nonresident" foreign corpora-
tion having a resident agent for service of process.'5
-The complainant seeking the attachment is not required to post
a bond for the issuance of the writ.'
-A summons is sufficient to bind the property under the attach-
ment.57
-Real estate is expressly covered."
-The property remains subject to the attachment unless and until
the nonresident debtor appears and gives satisfactory security for the
performance of the decree, thus discharging the lien; but if the debtor
fails to appear or fails to give security, the court has the power to
make any necessary orders.5 '
In addition the court stated:
It is apparent that once the property has been attached, the nonresi-
dent debtor may dissolve the attachment only by posting a satisfactory
bond to be approved by the court or chancellor in vacation, § 11-31-9.
'The principal defendant [nonresident debtor] cannot discharge the at-
tachment by challenging the validity of the attachment itself, even on
grounds of procedural irregularity, excessiveness, or lack of merit of the
underlying claim. By prevailing at the trial on the merits, the principal
defendant [nonresident debtor] can obtain the release of the [attached
property], but he cannot recover damages, interest or attorney's fees
based on wrongful attachment unless he successfully institutes a
separate action for malicious prosecution. Burt v. Roberts, 212 Miss.
576, 55 So. 2d 164 (1951).' Mississippi Chemical Corp. v. Chemical
Construction Corp., 444 F. Supp. 925, 932 (S.D. Miss. 1977).0*
In expounding further on the characteristics of the Mississippi pro-
cedure the district court quoted once more from the decision of Missis-
sippi Chemical Corp.:"1
Chemico [the nonresident debtor] had neither notice of plaintiff's inten-
tion unilaterally to invoke the Attachment in Chancery procedure nor
the opportunity to contest the propriety of the attachments either before
or after they were imposed. The plaintiff was not required to apply to
"Clark v. Louisville & N.R.R., 158 Miss. 287, 130 So. 302 (1930).
"Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 387, 88 So. 883 (1921).
S11. B. Rowell & Co. v. Sandifer, 129 Miss. 167, 91 So. 899 (1922).
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-31-3 (1972).
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-31-5 (1972).
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-31-9 (1972).
"MPI, Inc. v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. at 891-92.
01444 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1977). In this case the court declared the Mississippi
chancery attachment statute, as to the attached choses in action or indebtedness then
under consideration, unconstitutional as violative of procedural due process based on
Sniadach, Goldberg, Fuentes, and North Georgia Finishing.
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any disinterested common neutral judicial officer in order to bind the
attached sums, nor to demonstrate the probable validity of its underly-
ing claims, nor even to make any particularized showing that at-
tachments were needed either in order for this Court to acquire jurisdic-
tion over Chemico or in order to prevent the removal of the attached
funds from this jurisdiction. The Plaintiff was able to avail itself of the
statutory machinery of Attachment in Chancery without the posting of
any security, although Chemico can dissolve the attachments only by
the posting of adequate security .... 61
In what appears to be the district court's summary of the pro-
cedure it stated:
As we examine the Mississippi chancery statute, it is obvious that at-
tachment may be invoked by any person against a nonresident without
any showing of a particularized need, such as an immediate danger
that the nonresident debtor will convey away, destroy or conceal the
disputed property, or that satisfaction of the underlying claim is depen-
dent upon seizure of the specific property because of an impending
fraudulent transfer by the nonresident, depreciation or spoilation of
property, or other special equity which the attaching plaintiff may have
in the particular property seized, such as a constructive trust or
wrongful conversion of assets. Manifestly, the statutory procedure is
not limited to instances where seizure is 'directly necessary to secure an
important governmental or general public interest.' Nor can it be
asserted that in this case there was such a public or governmental in-
terest, as securing jurisdiction over a res when no other means of ac-
quiring jurisdiction exists . . . . the integrity of state controlled pro-
grams.... Next, the statutes are not aimed at meeting a special need for
very prompt action and Dupre fails to make a showing that prompt ac-
tion is necessary to preserve his rights. Finally, the Mississippi scheme
for chancery attachment is neither initiated nor monitored by a respon-
sible judicial officer of the state, but is invoked by a private party and
carried out by the state's ministerial agents, the chancery clerk and
county sheriff. The state is truly kept in the dark; and Dupre was the
prime and sole movant for invoking the state's chancery attachment
against MPI's real property.... [Tihe Mississippi chancery statute can
be invoked upon the sole condition that the alleged defendant debtor is
a nonresident of the state, no more need be alleged. (footnote omitted).61
Little analysis of the district court's findings is necessary. There
can be but one conclusion to be drawn about the chancery scheme; it
is a summary procedure, instituted by the plaintiff's lawyer and com-
pletely lacks judicial supervision. As measured by the due process re-
quirements of Sniadach and its progeny, the procedure appears un-
constitutional no matter how Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia
Finishing are interpreted in conjunction with one another.
"Id. at 932-33. quoted in MPI, Inc. v. McCullough. 463 F. Supp. at 892
"MPI, Inc. v McCullough, 463 F Supp. at 895-96.
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In its examination of the applicable case law relating to due pro-
cess, the district court reviewed Sniadach, Goldberg, Fuentes,
Mitchell, and North Georgia Finishing. In accord with what appears
to be the general rule the court relied on Fuentes and North Georgia
Finishing for the rule that due process requires notice and hearing
prior to the seizure of property. Moreover, the court noted the "ex-
traordinary situations" of Fuentes which justify postponing notice
and hearing and correctly concluded that the present case does not
belong in that category.
Mitchell was distinguished from Fuentes and propertly interpreted
by the district court as not undermining the due process requirements
of Fuentes and North Georgia Finishing. In distinguishing Mitchell
the court relied on what has been previously referred to as the dicta in
North Georgia Finishing. The court said Mitchell was different from
Fuentes and North Georgia Finishing because the procedure in
Mitchell required issuance of the writ by a judge and called for an im-
mediate postseizure hearing. Contrary to such an interpretation,
Mitchell appears to be distinguishable, because it is based on the fact
that the creditor in Mitchell had a real interest in the property seized.
In its analysis of whether an attachment of real estate warrants
fourteenth amendment protection the district court noted that the
Supreme Court had not decided any cases involving attachments
against real property beyond the summary affirmance in Spielman-
Fond. 64 Based on Hicks the district court determined that it was
bound by the decision of Spielman-Fond. As a result the court was
forced to distinguish Spielman-Fond from the case sub judice. In
doing so the court recognized that in Spielman-Fond the claim of the
attaching party was based on a mechanic's lien and hence insured "a
direct connection between the res and the underlying claim.""5 Also,
Spielman-Fond was distinguished because the filing of a mechanic's
lien does nothing more than cloud the title of the reality whereas an
attachment creates more than a mere nonpossessory lien because the
property was put into the chancery court's constructive possession.66
"McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1928) (per curiam) is another decision by the
Supreme Court dealing with an attachment of real property. However, as stated in
Fuentes at 91, n. 23, it is unclear what interests were involved in that case. "As far as
essential procedural due process doctrine goes, McKay cannot stand for any more than
was established in the Coffin Bros. and Ownbej cases on which it relied completely."
Id. The Coffin Bros. and Ownbey cases concerned important governmental interests,
and therefore seizure prior to notice and hearing was justified. Since we are not dealing
with an important governmental interest in the case sub judice McKay is of no
significance.
*sMPI, Inc. v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. at 898.
'It cannot be argued that Spielman-Fond is distinguishable on the basis that there
was a direct connection between the res and the underlying claim. (See Mitchell: rights
of creditors who have a real interest in the property are protected.) However, the
distinction by the court between a lien and an attachment is questionable. Both produce
the same effect: a cloud upon the title which acts to restrict alienability.
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The court's reliance on Hicks, in determining the significance of a
summary affirmance was misplaced. The controlling decision is that
of Mandel and thus Spielman-Fond is stripped of its precedential
value in all cases except those involving the same issue.
Having determined that it was not bound by Spielman-Fond, the
court cited several cases in which courts have struck down real estate
attachment procedures which lacked prior notice and hearing. The
court stated,
[w]e agree with their rationale that encumbering realty during the life
of the attachment is a burden on the right of alienation, interferes with
the ability to obtain necessary financing for the enjoyment of the prop-
erty, and creates a cloud upon the title and a reflection upon the
owner's credit in the business community.""
Based on Sniadach, its progeny, and the district court cases cited
herein, the court held the chancery attachment procedure violative of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in its application
to realty of nonresident debtors."
CONCLUSION
The decision reached by the court in MPI was a proper one,
although its interpretation of the applicable case law varied from that
of the author. It appears that the Mississippi chancery attachment
procedure, as it now stands, is unconstitutional because it lacks pro-
cedural due process. Even if viewed in light of the "liberal interpreta-
tion," the procedure falls short of due process requirements since it
completely lacks judicial supervision, and does not provide for any of
the other safeguards of the Louisiana procedure upheld in Mitchell.
Furthermore, the Mississippi procedure lacks other necessary safe-
guards. The procedure can be invoked by any person against a
nonresident. The attaching party need not file a bond in order to in-
voke the procedure. Should the attachment ultimately be shown to
have been wrongfully or mistakenly issued, the party whose property
was attached has no statutory entitlement to damages, interest, or at-
torney's fees other than through a separate action for malicious pros-
ecution. 0 In short, the procedure provides no legal protection from ir-
responsible and impartial evaluations of the need to resort to the
remedy.
'rerranova v. Avco Financial Services of Barre, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Vt.
1975); Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., 365 F. Supp.
1299 (D. Mass. 1973); Clement v. Fourth N. State St. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933 (D. N.H.
1973); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D. Me. 1973).
"MPI, Inc. v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. at 899.
89d. at 28.
'See notes 60-63 and accompanying textual material, supra.
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Any efforts to correct the present procedure would have to begin,
first, by differentiating between situations where attachment is the
only means by which the state can obtain jurisdiction over the non-
resident defendant, and those situations where the state has other
valid means of obtaining process over the defendant. The former
situation should be regarded as an "extraordinary situation," such as
that found in Fuentes, and as such, notice and prior hearing may be
postponed, but the procedure would have to be carried out by a judge
under strict statutory guidelines.
Provision would then have to be made to cover the situation where
the creditor has a real interest in the property attached. Here also the
procedure would have to be carried out by a judge under strict
statutory guidelines. The statutes would have to provide for an im-
mediate post-seizure hearing at which the party attached could seek
dissolution of the writ. Other safeguards which should be required in
this situation are the posting of a bond by the party seeking the attach-
ment and a provision for damages to be awarded the party whose
property is wrongfully or mistakenly seized.
Finally, in situations other than where the attachment is in
response to an "extraordinary situation" or where the creditor has a
real interest in the property, the only way the writ should issue is if it
is preceded by notice and a hearing.
In light of Sniadach, Fuentes, and their progeny, the Mississippi
chancery attachment procedure fails to meet the due process re-
quirements of the fourteenth amendment and is therefore unconstitu-
tional. This deficiency can be eradicated only through the addition of
safeguards which eliminate the arbitrary nature in which the writ is
procured.
Michael J. Vallette
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